CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 301

offer which we had made earlier in the year to provide naval and air

support to South Arabia after independence, since this was no longer

appropriate and was unlikely to be wanted by any likely government in

the country. Since it was important to maintain the cohesion and co-operation with us of the South Arabian forces, the supplies of military equipment to them which had already been arranged were

continuing. But we should seek if possible to avoid providing them with

Hunter aircraft as had previously been intended; other questions of

military and civil aid to South Arabia after independence should be left

for later consideration. We must also decide what action should be

taken about the 80,000 inhabitants of South Arabia who had citizenship

of the United Kingdom and Colonies but no other connection with this

country: he proposed that we should provide against the risk that

they might seek to come to this country in large numbers, by making

an Order in Council that would give them citizenship of South Arabia,

taking powers at the same time to deprive them of citizenship of the

United Kingdom and Colonies, though leaving for later decision whether

to exercise these powers. Finally, we should accept that there was no

prospect that the United Nations would agree to accept responsibility

for Perin and we should decide that the Kuria Muria Islands should revert

to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that he was in agreement with the

Foreign Secretary's proposals. From the military viewpoint the sooner

our forces were withdrawn from Aden the better. If we were to be able to

complete our withdrawal from South Arabia on 22nd November, it would be

essential to give preliminary warning on a confidential basis to the air

charter companies not later than 30th October. We should decide now to

plan for withdrawal on the 22nd November and seek to avoid the risks to

our forces that would be involved in keeping them in South Arabia for

even a short period beyond that date; in any event a decision to do so could not be delayed beyond 13th November. As regards the position after

we had withdrawn, it would be necessary to maintain naval forces in the

vicinity of Aden for a period in case it should be found necessary to

evacuate the 800 British subjects who would remain in Aden, but this

period should be kept as short as possible. He was doubtful whether

we should continue with our plan to provide a military mission to the South Arabian forces after independence or to provide a military guard for our Embassy in Aden: a military guard would in any case require legal protection.

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